much of the rationale undergirding modern federal freedom of information law, argued however that the history of free speech and press "bars any notion that the men of 1791 intended to provide for freedom to disseminate such information but to deny freedom to acquire it." 13 The modern right to know initially appeared in early 20 th century Supreme Court opinions. 14 Beginning in the 1930s, the Supreme Court struggled with whether, and then how, to recognize a constitutional right to know. Five Supreme Court justices endorsed a limited but constitutionally enforceable right-to-know during their various tenures. 15 However, extending any constitutional right is fraught with problems for the judiciary because critics fear that this activity reflects unbridled judicial activism. Yet some constitutional rights exist only because justices elected to extend the shadow of certain constitutional protections. This gray area, or shadow, of the Constitution is known as the penumbra.
Legally, the penumbra comprises the implicit rights granted by a constitution. The 14 Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936) , the first case to state a First Amendment link to information, invalidated a Louisiana law that taxed newspapers with a circulation of more than 20,000 copies weekly. The newspaper publishers successfully argued that this law violated their First Amendment free speech rights. In a unanimous opinion, Justice Sutherland wrote a compelling history of taxation on the press in pre-colonial England. He explained that these taxes were designed to limit the circulation of ideas contrary to the monarchy. The opinion noted that the Framers rejected these limitations and created the First Amendment. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) . 15 Justice Douglas was the most significant advocate for a right to know, though Justices Brennan, Powell, Marshall, and Stevens were equally inclined at times. DAVID O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 60 (Praeger 1981) . Justice Brennan, for example, said, "It is a mistake to suppose that the First Amendment protects only self-expression, only the rights to speak out. I believe that the First Amendment in addition fosters the values of democratic self-government." Id. at 143. None of these justices currently occupy the bench of the Supreme Court. Concerning this endorsement, the five justices who supported a right-to-know incurred criticism from the majority of their peers. Justice Stewart, for example, argued that extending a right to know to the constitutional penumbra would constitute an unacceptable level of judicial activism. Id. at 62. v. Bevans. 16 Penumbral rights have been articulated in different ways. In 1873, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes disparagingly referred to the penumbra as a "gray area where logic and principles falter." 17 And in a variety of opinions during his lengthy tenure as a U.S.
Court of Appeals judge for the Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand used the idea of a penumbra when referring to ideas that he deemed poorly defined and/or unclear. 18 While it is true that penumbral rights have been treated with suspicion and hostility, the fact is that certain deeply valued rights only exist by virtue of the penumbra. In 1965, the Supreme Court created a penumbral right to privacy when it invalidated a Connecticut law that banned contraceptives. 19 In the majority opinion, Justice Douglas noted that the "First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion. In like context, we have protected forms of "association" that are not political in the customary sense, but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members." 20 More than 50 years have passed since that decision, during which the right to privacy has become entrenched in our jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions implicate a constitutionally protected right to know. These cases contain reasoning in majority opinions, dicta, and even dissenting 16 Montgomery v. Bevans, 17 F. Cas. 628 (9 th C.C.D. Cal.) (1871). This is the case that historically has been referred to as first referencing the idea of a penumbra legally. The case concerned Mexican land grants under the Van Ness ordinance, not a topic that on its surface ties to modern discussions of a penumbra. Id. 17 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 654 (1873). Citing the penumbra is not a common legal idea. Four judges are responsible for the majority of decisions referencing a penumbra: Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Learned Hand, Benjamin N. Cardozo, and William O. Douglas. See Burr Henley, 'Penumbra': The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15(1) HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1987) . 18 Henley, supra note 17, at 87-89. 19 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965) . 20 Id. at 483. opinions demonstrating that Supreme Court justices have repeatedly considered or assumed that a right to know exists within the penumbra of the First Amendment. This nearly 100-year record clarifies the judiciary's current position regarding government officials' use of social media accounts.
As a threshold matter, relevant Court decisions also speak in terms of a constitutional right to receive information, which was firmly established by the 1960s. For example, in Stanley v. Georgia, a search of someone's home turned up obscene materials that were illegal under Georgia law. 21 Even though these materials clearly violated applicable law, the Court refused to criminalize the mere possession of private obscene material. In its holding, the Court protected the individual's First Amendment right to free expression, saying, "[I]t is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas." 22 The cases analyzed in this section are divided into two areas: access to publicly available information, and access to government information.
A. Access to Publicly Available Information
Cases regarding the access to publicly available information help resolve the question of whether the public can successfully assert a "right to know" and demand access to a government official's social media account. President Trump's Twitter feed, for example, is publicly available. It is only when Trump blocks users that they lose access to his account. 23 involve analogous instances in which the public was denied access to information that was otherwise publicly available. The majority of cases fall within this category.
These cases reveal two important points regarding a presumed right to access government officials' social media accounts. First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an individual's right to know is heightened when the desired information is necessary to further the goals of participatory democracy. And second, the government is prohibited from contracting the knowledge available to citizens or creating an undue burden on citizens who seek that information.
The Right to Know Furthers the Goals of Participatory Democracy
The right to know is perhaps most pronounced when the information at issue involves participation in the political process. Indeed, the Court has explicitly and unequivocally stated the importance of citizens' right to know in a democratically elected state. In Marsh v. State of Alabama, the Court stated that "citizens … must make decisions which affect the welfare of the community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored." 24
As such, the Court has afforded ample protection for an individual's right to receive information. 25 recipient's affirmative request. 26 The Court determined that the postmaster's actions both in withholding information and requiring individuals to request the mailings were unconstitutional. 27 The Court rationalized that people should be able to receive information in the mail without clearing these hurdles.
The Court also considered the right to receive information as a political speech issue in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 28 In Bellotti, the Court examined the issue of whether corporations had a First Amendment right to make monetary contributions to help influence the political process. 29 The appellants in this case, a national association of banks and corporations, wanted to spend money to publicize their political view on a referendum to enact a new tax. 30 An existing Massachusetts statute made it a crime for organizations to make political contributions or expenditures intended to sway voters. 31 In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that corporations did have the right to make contributions to the political process. 32 According to Justice Powell in the majority, this case is less about the rights of the corporation per se than the public's right to the information pertaining to the political contributions. 33
This basic principle was again articulated in Board of Education v. Pico, a suit brought by schoolchildren who protested the school board's removal of "anti-American, anti-Christian, 26 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 301 (1965). 27 Id.
28 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) . 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. at 776-77.
anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy" texts from district's junior high and high school libraries. 34 In a plurality decision, Justice Brennan wrote that students had a First Amendment right to access available information in the library so they could become more informed citizens. 35 As the Pico Court explained:
[J]ust as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner, such access prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon be members. 36 While the students obviously could not demand the school board purchase certain books, they had a right to obtain existing information, even in venues like public schools that have traditionally limited First Amendment rights.
In a comparatively significant context, a duo of Supreme Court cases involving the distribution of religious information held that the First Amendment protects both the right to distribute and to receive literature. The cases thus far involve political information fairly directly, but the Court has read this interest broadly. It has asserted that some information, though not specifically political in nature, can still be vital to participatory democracy. Society as whole is concerned with preserving democratic principles in ways that fall outside traditional political debate or discourse. 40 The Supreme Court evaluated these issues in two cases concerning access to reproductive information that is commercial in nature. 41 First, in Bigelow v. New York, the Court invalidated a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor to circulate advocacy that helped individuals procure an abortion. The Court said that citizens were entitled to receive this informationan advertisement that included "information and counseling" for New York abortion services -because it was "factual material of clear 'public interest.'" 42 38 Id. 
And second, in Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
the Court found unconstitutional a statute barring pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. 43 Consumers who challenged the statute argued that it prevented them from comparing prices of prescription medications. 44 The Court recognized that this impacted consumers, especially "the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged," who had a vested interest in obtaining this life-or-death information. 45 The Court explained that this interest was of the highest concern:
"As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." 46 Therefore, the consumers had a right to know, which stemmed from traditional free speech principles. According to the Court, "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both." 47 Access here functioned as a mechanism to thwart paternalism and ignorance. 48 This decision was driven by an analysis of democratic principles and societal interests. 49 43 Virginia State Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 748 (1976). 44 Id. 45 Id. 46 Id. at 763. 47 Id. at 756. 48 Id. at 770 (decrying the board's "highly paternalistic approach" that functions to "keep[ ] the public in ignorance." 49 Extending Justice Blackmun's argument, society may also benefit from protecting consumer information. Using the informed democracy approach, Blackmun noted that "[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable." Id. at 765.
The Bigelow and Virginia State Pharmacy Board cases may appear to be outliers because they involve sensitive medical information. However, the Court has decided other pure commercial speech cases similarly. The Court protected commercial speech interests in real estate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, asserting that the "societal interest in 'the free flow of commercial information' […] is in no way lessened by the fact that the subject of the commercial information here is realty rather than abortions or drugs." 50 And it prioritized the public's interest in receiving advertisements from attorneys over the State Bar of Arizona's interest in propounding professional values by restricting those same commercial advertisements. 51
The principles intrinsic to these cases would support protecting an individual's access to public officials' social media posts. Being able to view and respond to policy announcements and statements associated with the officials' duties is critical to participatory government.
Without access, fruitful dialogue is stymied.
The Government Cannot Contract Available Knowledge or Impose an Undue Burden on Obtaining Information
The government cannot act capriciously by curbing knowledge to which the public already has access.
This issue has arisen with some frequency in cases involving access to reproductive health information, from sex education to contraceptive counseling for couples and information 50 Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977) . 51 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364-65 (1977) . Justice Blackmun quoted from Arizona Justice Holohan's dissenting opinion in the lower court, which said, "Obviously the information of what lawyers charge is important for private economic decisions by those in need of legal services. Such information is also helpful, perhaps indispensable, to the formation of an intelligent opinion by the public on how well the legal system is working and whether it should be regulated or even altered. . . The rule at issue prevents access to such information by the public." Id. at 358.
for sexual assault victims. The cases have uniformly upheld the individual's right to obtain critical health information. In Griswold v. Connecticut, for example, the Court invalidated a statute that criminalized dispensing contraceptives or information about contraception. 52 The Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and its medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories under this statute, partly for providing contraceptive devices to couples, and partly for giving "information, instruction, and medical advice" to stop conception. 53 The Court specifically articulated the individuals' right to know, saying that the "right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read." 54 As a result, "[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge." 55 Even Justice Stewart acknowledged in his dissent that had the directors of Planned Parenthood merely advised people on the use of contraceptives, they would have had a strong First Amendment free-speech claim. 56 This same rationale guided the Court in Pico. 57 The students in Pico protested the widespread censorship of materials in the library. The Court explained that access to those materials was critical. Once information was generally made available to the students, the school board could not limit that information without substantial justification, and certainly not with an 52 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965) (emphasis added). 53 Id. at 480. 54 Id. at 482. 55 Id. 56 Id.
57 See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), discussed supra in text accompanying note 34-36. eye to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion." 58 While the students obviously could not demand purchase certain books, they had a right to obtain existing information, even in venues like public schools that have traditionally limited First Amendment rights.
Similarly, the government cannot impose undue burden on citizens exercising their right to know certain information. This is why the Court rejected the postmaster's claims in Lamont. It declined to allow the postmaster to impose any type of duty on recipients to affirmatively request communist literature. 59
In the context of social media accounts, otherwise public accounts that contain political content, such as President Trump's, should be made available for users to access. These accountholders should be prohibited from engaging in viewpoint discrimination to block users.
Purported "solutions" that impose barriers on blocked individuals to regain access are insufficient. Demanding that blocked individuals engage in additional actions to access content would contravene existing right-to-know and undue-burden cases. The only effective solution is to provide legally robust protections that protect users from being blocked to begin with. (1996) . These provisions required cable providers to block "patently offensive" programming, which could only be restored after the consumer sent in a written request. Id. at 754. The Court said these provisions were "overly restrictive, sacrificing important First Amendment interests for too speculative a gain." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
B. Access to Compelled Government Information
This manuscript has thus far focused on accessing information that was or could be publicly available, such as political and religious information, reproductive health information, and commercial information. The issues presented are far different when that information is not generally available to the public. This section of the manuscript analyzes a narrower and more contentious line of cases that purport to establish what rights, if any, individuals have to compel the release of government information. In the context of this manuscript, if a public official has a private social media account, is there a First Amendment justification for making that account public?
Typically, the Court has declined to force the government to reveal information. Because the Constitution lacks an explicit right to know information, individuals lack a mirror right to compel that information.
This rationale has been used in several cases, all involving access to jails or prisons, to deny journalists access to information. In Pell v. Procunier, the Supreme Court held that the media has "no constitutional right of access to prisoners or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." 60 Similarly, in Saxbe v. Washington, the majority held that prohibiting interviews between the press and federal inmates was constitutional because it "does not deny the press access to sources of information available to members of the general public." 61 Finally, federal access statutes, to obtain pertinent information. 63 In the plurality opinion, Justice Warren
Berger said, "This Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government control." 64 In terms of a right to know, the public and press only have a freedom to "communicate information once it is obtained," not to force information to be revealed. 65 This rationale has also been used to exclude the press and public from criminal trials. In Justice Berger also stated that the freedoms of speech and the press entail a right to gather information by attending trials. 71 Under the First Amendment's right to receive information and ideas, the free speech and press clauses "prohibit [the] government from summarily closing courtroom doors that had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted." 72
In a special concurrence, 73 Justice Stewart wrote that while the First and Fourteenth
Amendments gave the public and press the right to attend all trials, both criminal and civil, this right was limited. 74 Some circumstances, including space limitations, safety concerns, and privacy of minors, could warrant limiting the attendance of the press and/or the public at trial. 75 Justice Stevens, in a regular concurrence, noted the precedential importance of this case:
"[F]or the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment." 76 This case demonstrates that press members, as representatives of the 70 Id. at 572. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall also pointed out the need for ensuring a fair trial in their special concurrence. Id. at 557. 71 Id. at 576. Justice Burger also drew upon the right to assemble in conjunction with the free speech and press clauses. Id. at 577-78. 72 Id. at 576. This extension of the First Amendment to protection of criminal trials was argued as natural by Justice Burger. Access to trials is an implicit part of the penumbra of the First Amendment. Court held that preliminary hearings are "sufficiently like a trial" to justify comparable openness. 79 Although the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial must be balanced against the public's right of access, the "explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public." 80 77 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 501-505 (1984) . The process of jury selection is "itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the criminal justice system." In this ruling, Justice Burger echoed the reasoning from Richmond, citing the history of openness of trial proceedings as well as the use of openness to enhance the actual and perceived fairness of criminal trials. Id. at 501-505 78 Id. at 512 (stating that "[w]hen limited closure is ordered, the constitutional values sought to be protected by holding open proceedings mat be satisfied later by making a transcript of the closed proceedings available"). 79 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986). 80 Id. at 7.
This includes access to preliminary hearings in person, and, when these hearings are closed for specific reasons, eventual access to transcripts of these hearings. To withhold even a transcript
would "frustrate what [the Court has] characterized as the "community therapeutic value" of openness." 81
The Supreme Court offers significantly less guidance in determining whether a public official can keep private an otherwise public social media account. There are some limited circumstances where the Supreme Court has compelled the government to provide information to the public under an extension of the First Amendment, although this extension has been limited to checks on the judicial and criminal process. It is likely that private social media accounts of public officials would not rise to this narrow standard and the expectation is that they could remain semi-private. 82
II. Statutory Access to Government Information
Although the overview of relevant Supreme Court cases 83 clarified that the Court recognizes a substantive right to know, there are inadequate discrete mechanisms in place to safeguard that constitutional right. 84 The right to know may be a presumed penumbral right, but 81 Id. at 13. 82 These accounts could remain only semi-private because the courts have consistently ruled that we do not have an expectation of privacy in a legal sense to most electronic communications, especially on semi-public forums like social networking sites. It is unlikely that a right to know would extend a requirement that public officials automatically make public an otherwise private account, or mandate that all constituents be "friended" to access an otherwise private account. it is not explicitly articulated in the First Amendment. 85 To tackle this problem, the federal government has instead relied on statutes to delineate the boundaries of government transparency and outline the precise contours of the public's legal right to know about government affairs. 86 Reliance on statutes to safeguard these vital rights, however, presents two serious issues.
First, statutes are ill-equipped to combat the inertia of long-standing government opacity.
Statutory relief can be painfully slow and yield, at best, inconsistent results. Furthermore, statutes are inherently less stable than fundamental constitutional protections. They are more easily altered and subject to political whims. And second, transparency statutes apply only to records under government control. While these statutes may cover many records desired by individuals seeking access, certain critical documents are outside the statute's ambit. This section of the manuscript addresses both issues and ultimately suggests that mutable statutory solutions should be eschewed in favor of strengthened constitutional protections.
A. Statutory Protection Yields Inconsistent Results
Relying on statutes to protect the right of access has yielded, at best, inconsistent results.
These statutes are ill-equipped to tackle the unique challenges presented by entrenched government opacity. This manuscript will use the most prominent federal statute, the Freedom of Information Act (1966) (FOIA), to illustrate the dangers presented by this inconsistency.
85 These "unenumerated" nature of these rights leave them particularly vulnerable to challenge. For example, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade has protects a penumbral right of privacy. The resulting opinion rests on a "shaky foundation," which many scholars anticipate will be challenged. Constitution to provide for confidentiality when the national interest so requires. There are some who have expressed concern that the language of this bill will be construed in such a sway as to impair Government operations. I do not share this concern." JAMES T Another issue is that statutes are inherently more susceptible to amendment and political whim than fundamental constitutional protections. 99 For example, the Department of Justice, which is often subject to political pressure from the executive branch, has the statutory responsibility for overseeing FOIA compliance. 100 In reality, federal regulatory and administrative agencies self-regulate. The Supreme Court has been complicit in these agency tactics since the 1970s. In fact, many Supreme Court decisions have clearly contravened the FOIA's purposereducing the categories of information available, and preferentially balancing competing interests, such as confidentiality and privacy.
B. Transparency Statutes Are Limited to Records Under Government Control
Transparency statutes have always been limited to records under government control.
FOIA applies to records held by federal agencies and departments, including the Executive
Office of the President, 101 Even if lawfully created agency records did exist, but were misplaced outside of agency jurisdiction, those records could not be compelled. 706 Furthermore, records generated by private companies that contracted with the government could not be considered agency records unless they were held by federal executive agencies. 707 Federal employees have taken advantage of this loophole, either inadvertently or intentionally. A 2015 Government Business Council survey of 412 federal employees found that 33% of surveyed employees use personal email at least sometimes. 103 Unless agencies establish specific protocols, email sent using a personal device means that the agency does not have a copy of that record, putting it outside of agency control. Thirty-one percent of respondents indicated that their agency did not archive personal email involving government business;
another 47% stated that they did not know their agency policy. 104 Twenty-seven percent of respondents cited "potential FOIA requests" as a reason that inhibits candid internal email communication within their department/agency. 105 It seems insufficient to use mutable statutory protections to guarantee access to even a retroactive record of public officials' social media accounts. Not only are existing transparency statutes inconsistently used, leading to uneven distribution of public records, the majority of the social media accounts at issue would not even constitute a public record under existing definitions. Social media accounts are owned by private corporations, and the government does not have the power to compel those records to be made publicly available.
III. Access to Public Officials' Social Media Accounts
The "right to know" cases addressed thus far in this manuscript 106 analyzed the individual's general right to access information, whether that information is already publicly available or the individual is seeking to compel its release. None of these cases, however, has addressed the specific issue of accessing public officials' speech on social media. And the statutory protections safeguarding access to information are inconsistently applied, inapplicable, (1) Is the account "personal" or "official"?
(2) Does the content posted to the account suggest that the it is intended to function as a public forum?
Although these issues are not in and of themselves determinative, they provide guidance to courts considering whether to preserve the right of the public to access the account.
A. Forum Analysis
The question of whether, and to what extent, government officials can block constituents or limit their access to official social media posts depends on how these social media accounts are characterized. The government's authority to restrict or limit speech is defined by the forum in which that speech occurs. There are four types of fora, each of which entails varying levels of First Amendment Protection: nonpublic fora, traditional public fora, designated public fora, and limited public fora. When speech occurs in a public forum, the government's ability to regulate discourse is severely constrained.
Some spaces are nonpublic fora. In these spaces, the government can impose various speech restrictions as long as they are reasonable. 108
On the opposite end of the spectrum are traditional public fora, which receive the highest level of First Amendment protection. These fora include physical spaces, like streets and parks, that are traditionally used by the public to assemble and discuss public questions. 109 To curb speech in these spaces, the government must demonstrate that their regulation survives strict scrutiny; thus, it must show it has a compelling state interest, and its restriction(s) must be narrowly tailored. 110 The government can also impose content-neutral time, place or manner restrictions. 111
In the middle are designated public fora and limited public fora. Designated public fora include spaces specifically set aside by the government for public speech and expression. These designated public fora are entitled to the same heightened First Amendment protection as 108 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 109 Id. at 45. 110 Id. 111 Id.
traditional public fora. However, they lack the same robustness of traditional public fora because the government is still entitled to reclassify a designated public forum as a private space. 112 Thus, protecting free speech in these spaces is, to some extent, subject to government whim. Limited public fora are different because they allow enhanced speech restrictions according to "the limited and legitimate purposes for which [the space] was created." 113 The government opens the space for public discourse, but it can limit the content of conversation within that space. In these spaces, the government is only prohibited from engaging in viewpoint discrimination. 114
Public forum analysis cases often speak in terms of physical space, but the concept of a "public forum" is far broader. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,
the Supreme Court held that the University of Virginia engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when it denied a Christian student organization's reimbursement request to the Student Activities Fund ("SAF"). 115 Even though the SAF was a forum "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense," the same analysis applies. 116 By opening up SAF funds to student organizations, UVA created a "limited public forum" and was limited by the attendant boundaries, among which is a restriction on viewpoint discrimination. . 114 Id. 115 Id. 116 Id.
B. Application of the Government Speech Doctrine
As noted above, the government is prohibited from engaging in viewpoint discrimination in public fora. One exception to this rule is the government speech doctrine. Under this doctrine, when the government is the speaker, it may make "content-based choices" to ensure its message is conveyed properly. 117 This doctrine enables the government to "take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted. 118 Id. (discussing application of the doctrine in situation where the government uses public funds to promote its message), and citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) . 119 Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 120 Id. at 2246, 2248. 121 Id. at 2248. 122 Id. 123 Id. at 2251.
The Supreme Court also considered the issue of government speech in Matal v. Tam, which invalidated the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act. 124 In Matal, a rock singer sought to trademark his group name, "The Slants," which is a derogatory term aimed at the Asian population. 125 The band members, who are Asian-American, sought to "reclaim" the derogatory term. 126 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application because it violated a provision of the Lanham Act that prohibited registering trademarks that "disparage" individuals, beliefs, or institutions. 127 The PTO unsuccessfully argued that trademarks constitute government speech, and that by issuing a trademark for "The Slants," it would be perceived as the speaker of a derogatory term. 128 In rejecting the PTO's argument, the Court noted that none of the factors present in Walker inhered in Tam. 129 A registered trademark is not typically perceived as government messaging, unlike the messages on license plates. The government isn't unwillingly thrust into the role of "speaker" by a trademark.
The government speech doctrine serves two main principles. It protects the government from adopting messages that it does not want to adopt, and it ensures the government's message is insulated from distortion. One measure to achieve the latter goal may ostensibly be curbing criticism that confuses the government's messaging. But can government officials silence critics on social media to ensure the sanctity of their messaging? 124 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 125 Id. at 1751. 126 Id. 127 Id. at 1753. 128 Id. at 1759. 129 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1759 (2017).
Government speech is notably different from the government use of social media. This difference was articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Davison v. Randall . When a government official invites discourse and provides a platform for that discourse, there is no danger of "garbling or distorting" the government's message. 130 First, the constituents' comments are identified by username, and so are clearly not government speech. 131 And second, the government official invited the discourse and, thus, invited the introduction of nuance and criticism. 132 The messages put forth by commenters on a public official's social media posts are not attributable to, nor viewed as endorsed by, the public official. Therefore, the government speech doctrine is inapposite here.
C. Packingham v. North Carolina (2017)
In 2017, after having established that social media accounts can function as "metaphysical" public fora, the Supreme Court turned its attention to speech on social media platforms. Packingham v. North Carolina 133 is "one of the first" Supreme Court case that analyzes in depth the First Amendment implications of access to social media. 134 North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge. These websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. 139
The language in the Court's opinion reflects the rationale in the Court's numerous "right to know" opinions. 140 The Court concerns itself not just with Packingham's right to convey information, but from his right to receive it on the social media platform.
The opinion also discussed, at length, the democratic promise of social media, a concern central to the right to know cases addressed in this manuscript. 141 This language, recognizing the rights of individuals to be fully informed and participate in the democratic process, arguably supports compelled access to government officials' social media accounts. However, this specific issue has not yet been adjudicated by the Supreme Court. In Packingham, the Court even decried the severely limited jurisprudence on First Amendment rights and the internet, particularly social media. 143 The analogous situations addressed thus far support finding that the Court would view limiting access to these sites as an impermissible restriction on the First Amendment.
D. The Status of Public vs. Private Social Media Accounts
The 
Courts should consider whether the government official's account is "personal"
or "official."
By safeguarding Packingham's access to social media, and by extension recognizing the high-value discourse facilitated by preserving social media discourse, the Court broadly proclaimed that social media accounts are public fora. This distinction becomes muddied when considering the fact that the internet, like the physical world, consists of both public and private spaces. 147 Smolla, supra note 145, at 23. Smolla also noted that these sites could be "at times classified as organs for the government's own expression, and treated as government speech." Id. For a discussion of the "government speech" issue, see infra Section II.C.
In the only Court of Appeals decision evaluating these issues, Davison v. Randall, the Fourth Circuit resolved the dispute by considering the government official's actions with respect to her social media account. 148 In that case, Brian Davison brought a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against Phyllis Randall, the chair of the Loudon County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors. 149 Randall had blocked Davison from her "Chair Phyllis Randall" Facebook page after he criticized her official actions regarding the school budget and farm inspections. 150 The court found that this ban was improper because not only did Randall The analysis becomes cloudier when considering private social media accounts. The designation that an account is "official" signifies that it, much like a dedicated website, is intended to support the back-and-forth exchange of information between the public official and her constituents. The question becomes whether a public official's private social media account can ever qualify as a public forum.
Smolla suggests the adoption of a "bright-line rule" stating two things. First, governmentheld social media platforms and official accounts could be deemed public fora. 153 And second, private social media accounts held by public officials cannot, by definition, qualify as public fora. 154 Public fora are created through specific, intentional governmental action. Private social media accounts, on the other hand, are the property of private social media platformsnot the government. They also reflect the "private choices of political officeholders," and they are governed by different First Amendment principles. 155 Smolla expressed concern that treating officials' social media accounts as public fora would have deleterious effects. While public fora are neutral by design, officials' private accounts are inherently partisan. Smolla said:
If a public officeholder is forced to treat his or her social-media page as a public forum, the page will lose its character as the officeholder's own unique, individual, candid and authentic expression, and instead become a bowdlerized platform collecting the random messages of any and all, stripped of any distinctive personality or direction. 156
Smolla's argument is troubling for a duo of reasons. 153 Smolla, supra note 145, at 23. 154 Id. 155 Id. 156 Id. 158 He still attacks the "Radical Left Democrats" and "Fake News Media." 159 And he still suggests that Saturday Night Live is colluding with Democrats to present one-sided coverage of his presidency. 160 What's perhaps more astonishing is that these three tweets reflect a mere one- constituents have "almost infinite channels and platforms" to voice their opinions, but adopting
Smolla's "bright-line test" would encourage government officials to communicate with constituents via private social media accounts in lieu of government-owned or designated "official" accounts. Perversely, the more an official seeks to shape the narrative, the more inclined that official would be to use private social media accounts to share critical information.
On private platforms, the officials could ban constituents with relative impunity, silencing their contributions to critical political discourse and controlling the story. Randall used her page as a "tool of governance," not only by designating the page as belonging to a "government official," 172 but sharing information with the public, and inviting constituent feedback. 173 These latter two concerns, specifically the encouragement of public comment, were deemed determinative. 174 The court also explicitly rejected Randall's argument that Facebook is private and thus cannot be a public forum. 175 The court raised several examples 168 Id.
in which forum analysis had previously extended to private property that was designated for public use or which was controlled by the government. 176 The Davison opinion recognizes that a government official cannot disavow the official capacity of her actions by conveying information via a private social media account. The opinion also refuses to enable government officials to use these accounts to obfuscate criticism of their official actions. 178 Id. at 552-553. 179 Id. at 567-568. 180 Id. 181 Id. at 577.
The general trend suggests that public officials' social media accounts are public fora. By extension, government officials, therefore, cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination to ban or block users. However, the case law and jurisprudence regarding this specific question are sparse.
The concerns of scholars such as Rodney Smolla may persuade a court to carve out and define "private" social media spaces based on the characteristics of social media use. Furthermore, the assertion that private social media accounts are not government property, but the property of private social media platforms, should be given special consideration.
IV. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has established that the Constitution includes a penumbral "right to know," which recognizes an individual's interest in securing information about government operations. The relevant case law centered around two themes. The first theme is access to publicly available information. The Court protects an individual's right to access this information, especially where access furthers the goals of a participatory democracy. The Court also has stated that absent a compelling reason, the government is prohibited from contracting available information or propounding any undue burden in obtaining that information. The second theme is access to compelled information. The Court has typically declined to force the government to reveal information that is not already known to the public.
Various mechanisms have been put in place to protect and further the right of individuals to access publicly available information. The most obvious of these is the statutory protections afforded by FOIA. Although FOIA includes many important protections for safeguarding access, it comes with a duo of problems that renders it ineffective in safeguarding an individual's right of access here. First, statutes involving access yield inconsistent results, especially in the face of government inertia. And second, the statutes' reach is limited, leaving individuals unable to use the statutory mechanisms to secure certain important documents.
This background information raises the question of how courts would evaluate the public's right to access the social media accounts of public officials, particularly their private social media accounts. To address this question, the manuscript first discussed forum analysis, determining that certain of the officials' social media accounts would likely be deemed a metaphysical public forum. This determination would limit public officials' ability to curb speech on their accounts.
The manuscript next turned to, and rejected, the government speech doctrine as applied to social media accounts. The doctrine enables government officials to silence certain discourse if it would impede or distort the government speaker's messaging. Had it applied, it could empower officials to silence speech on their social media accounts. However, the rationale behind the government speech doctrine simply does not extend to public officials' social media accounts.
Then, the manuscript considered the most directly relevant Supreme Court case,
Packingham v. North Carolina, which established the principle that social media accounts are public fora. 182 The Court's position was clear; however, there are reasonable arguments for determining that Packingham's reading may be overbroad. Instead, social media consists of various private and public spaces. Public officials' social media accounts may fall in one or the other of these categories, depending on context.
And finally, the manuscript addressed the account characteristics a court may consider when determining whether individuals can claim a right to access a public official's social media account. The court may consider whether the account is designated as "official" or "private." The former accounts are more likely to be deemed public because their designation suggests that the information includes official government business intended for the public to view and respond to. Scholars differ, however, regarding whether individuals can assert a legitimate right to access the private social media accounts of public officials. On one hand, the "private" designation suggests that the account is not intended for public consumption. This, plus the fact that the accounts are owned by private companies, not the government, weighs against access. On the other hand, the "private" designation shouldn't be used to shield accounts from the public eye, especially if critical government business is being conducted through the private account. This indicates that the court should consider the content posted to the social media account. If the account is used to share important government information, and solicit feedback from constituents, then there would be a strong argument for access.
More robust protections for access must be secured. The Packingham court did much of the heavy lifting when it comes to paving the way for individual access to public officials' social media accounts. And certainly, the (few) courts that have considered access to these social media accounts have held in line with Packingham, supporting broad access. But even with
Packingham's broad, protective language, there is still room to suggest that public officials are empowered to wield excessive control on social media accounts designated as "private." This result would be a perverse misreading of the law, creating a technicality that furthered the goals of disinformation, misinformation, and censorship. Thus, there should be clear guidelines regarding when social media accounts are public fora. These guidelines would instruct courts not only to consider the account designation, but to engage in a substantive analysis of the nature of the account. If a "private" account is being used to engage in back-and-forth discourse with
